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CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND DOHA, 
QATAR 
Sophia Sofferman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Analysis shows that, on the one hand, the growing need for daily 
necessities and economic development in China will in the future 
result in more GHG emissions, whereas on the other hand, the 
implementation of a sustainable development strategy will ena-
ble China to do its best within the limits of its capacity and de-
velopment level to reduce the growth rate of GHG emissions.  
Thus China can make positive contributions to mitigating global 
climate change while emissions have to be necessarily in-
creased."1 
 The above expressed viewpoint encompasses one of the 
primary obstacles in today’s international climate change nego-
tiations because it speaks to the need of developing countries to 
continue developing, but also the global need to reduce green-
house gas emissions overall to prevent catastrophic climate 
change.  
  In 1992, 172 governments participated in the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development (or the 
“Earth Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  One- hundred and 
eight heads of state and government were in attendance, as 
well as over 2,400 representatives of non-governmental organi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Sophia Sofferman, JD Pace University School of Law 2014, served as a 
Note and Comment Editor of PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW.  I would like 
to thank my parents, Doctor Bruce Sofferman & Reverend Deborah Soffer-
man, and my grandparents, Shirley and Jerry Blecher, for always believing 
in me, and for continuing to love and support me throughout my law school 
career.  I would also like to thank William for always keeping me to date with 
important environmental issues, which in turn sparked my interest to re-
search this very topic.  This article is dedicated to the five of you. 
1 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 2004). 
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zations (“NGO’s”).2  The Earth Summit, the goal of which was 
to “redirect international and national plans and policies to en-
sure that all economic decisions fully took into account any en-
vironmental impact,”3 produced a handful of legal documents, 
among which was the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC,” or “Convention”).  The 
UNFCCC’s stated objective is the “stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate.”4  
As such, it was the first international treaty to tackle climate 
change on this scale, and would be a founding and guiding doc-
ument for international negotiations dealing with the issue of 
climate change for at least the next twenty years.  There are 
currently 195 parties to the Convention, including the United 
States that signed and ratified the Convention under the 
George H. W. Bush Administration in 1992.5 
From the very beginning, the Convention took a compre-
hensive approach to tackling the climate change problem, and 
fully considered the implied consequences of a global shift away 
from fossil fuels.  The most obvious and contentious conse-
quence is that a reduction in the use of the world’s cheapest 
and most available energy source would have some effect, pos-
sibly negative, on national, regional, and world economies.6  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 
1992), available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html. 
3 Id. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 
Kyoto Protocol, Art. 2, (CORRECT DATE), (available at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf) (noting that “such a level [of greenhouse 
gas concentration] should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food produc-
tion is not threatened and not to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner.”) 
5 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Essential 
Background, (available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/citation/2-100.htm). 
6 The preamble to the Convention “Recogniz[es] the special difficulties of 
those countries, especially developing countries, whose economies are par-
ticularly dependent on fossil fuel production, use, and exportation as a conse-
quence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions, [and] Affirm[s] 
that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and eco-
nomic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse 
impacts on the latter.” U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC], Full Text of the Convention (available at http://unfccc.int/ 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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However, the Convention recognized that although transition-
ing away from fossil fuels would be costly and difficult, it does 
not necessarily have to have a negative effect on economies.7  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change notes in its Preamble that “various actions to address 
climate change can be justified economically in their own right 
and can also help in solving other environmental problems.”8  
Still, it is apparent that the parties negotiating the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change were con-
cerned that a meaningful shift in the way the world uses and 
produces energy would not be easy, and would require a large 
commitment from the world’s nations both economically and 
politically.  In the preamble to the Convention, and reiterated 
in Article 3, Section 1, is the tentative answer to these tough 
economic issues under the Convention: the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.9 
II. COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities is rooted in equity and shared re-
sponsibility for the climate crisis.   
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change has adopted the term “common” to suggest that “cer-
tain risks affect and are affected by every nation on earth.”10  
This includes the climate and ozone shield.11  The idea behind 
reducing mutual risks is that “all nations should ‘cooperate in a 
spirit of global partnership.’”12  On the other hand, “responsibil-
ities” are said to be “differentiated,” in that not all countries 
have the same financial responsibilities for addressing climate 
change because of different financial capabilities and different 
historic and current levels of carbon-dioxide emissions.13  Thus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (2004). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 277. 
13 Id.  
3
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common but differentiated responsibilities “charges some na-
tions, ordinarily the Rich, with carrying a greater share of the 
burden than others, ordinarily the Poor.”14 
The idea of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities arguably appears first in the third para-
graph of the Preamble of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, preceded only by the paragraphs 
acknowledging that climate change is a “common concern of 
humankind,” and that it is anthropogenic, or man-made. This 
third paragraph notes: 
. . .that the largest share of historical and current global emis-
sions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, 
that per capita emissions in developing countries are still rela-
tively low and that the share of global emissions originating in 
developing countries will grow to meet their social and develop-
ment needs . . . 15 
The acknowledgment that developed nations have a histor-
ic responsibility to facilitate in climate mitigation and adapta-
tion efforts is key to understanding not only the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-
pabilities, but also to understanding some of the most conten-
tious issues at the negotiating table today.  Differentiated re-
sponsibilities in this case means that developed countries, 
listed in Annex-I of the UNFCCC, have a greater responsibility 
to facilitate a global transition away from fossil fuels because 
they have not only burned more fossil fuels historically than 
developing countries, but also have become rich by doing so, 
and are therefore in a better economic position to tackle the 
problem. 
Also at the heart of the contention over common but differ-
entiated responsibilities as stated in the second-half of the par-
agraph quoted above which states that “per capita emissions in 
developing countries are still relatively low and that the share 
of global emissions originating in developing countries will 
grow to meet their social and development needs.”16  This 
statement anticipated the current situation and the obstacles 
that current climate negotiations face regarding countries with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Id.  
15 UNFCCC, supra note 6, Preamble. 
16 Id.  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and 
especially China.17  These countries are still both socially and 
economically developing, yet they emit large amounts of green-
house gases.18  This is the most difficult issue that climate ne-
gotiations face for the technical reason that there is a signifi-
cant portion of GHG emissions that are not regulated by any 
agreement or treaty, and for the political reason that developed 
countries such as the United States, and now Canada,19 do not 
want to be bound by reduction targets while other major emit-
ters are not.   
As it first appears in the UNFCCC preamble:  
  . . . the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an 
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities and their social and economic conditions . . . 20 
Furthermore, the director of the Climate and Energy Pro-
gram of the World Resources Institute, Jennifer Morgan re-
flected in response to the slow-moving approach of the 
UNFCCC that “…the truth is that the UNFCCC will not stop 
moving in slow motion until key countries do.  All eyes must 
now turn to the newly re-elected President Obama and the new 
Chinese leadership, amongst others, to see when large-scale 
change is going to come.” 21 Furthermore, Morgan continues 
that: 
A successful agreement in 2015 will need to preserve the under-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 BASIC countries urge developed nations to raise emissions reduction 
ambitions, China Climate Change Info- Net, http://en.ccchina.gov.cn/ 
Detail.aspx?newsId=38399&TId=97 (last visited July 23, 2013). 
18 Id.  
19 Mike De Souza, It’s official: Harper government withdraws from Kyoto 
climate agreement, O.CANADA (Dec. 14,2012), http://o.canada.com/ 
2012/12/14/its-official-harper-government-withdraws-from-kyoto-climate-
agreement/. 
20 The State of Global Energy Efficiency, ABB (2010), 
http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot266.nsf/veritydisplay/9664b7ef441d0 
339c12579e60039a0d9/$file/the%20state%20of%20global%20energy%20e
fficiency.pdf. 
21 Jennifer Morgan, Reflections on Cop 18 in Doha: Negotiators Made On-
ly Incremental Progress, WRI Insights (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/12/reflections-cop-18-doha-negotiators-
made-only-incremental-progress. 
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lying notion that those with the capacity to take bold climate ac-
tion should go further faster…and…the simple fact that bold ac-
tion by all countries, including developing ones, will be necessary 
to hold global mean temperature increase below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels.22 
This comment will focus on the role that the principle of 
common and differentiated responsibilities plays in global cli-
mate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on 
Climate Change and more recent climate negotiations by the 
Conference of the Parties.  More specifically, this comment will 
focus on the implications this has for developing and developed 
countries, namely on China and the United States as the two 
largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, and as de-
veloping and developed countries respectively.  
III. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
In 1997, the United Nations held its third Conference of 
the Parties Meeting (“COP 3”), which met in Kyoto, Japan and 
negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change.23  The Kyoto Protocol 
outlined specific binding greenhouse gas reduction targets.24  
These targets only applied to countries that the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change set forth as being 
developed country (“Annex I”) Parties.25  Unlike the UNFCCC, 
the Kyoto Protocol legally required nations to reduce their 
greenhouse gases (“GHG”) emissions by a specific reduction 
target and on a strict timeline.26  The Kyoto Protocol was nego-
tiated because Parties to the Convention decided that the 
commitments outlined in the UNFCCC were “not adequate” 
and they wanted to “take appropriate action beyond 2000, in-
cluding the strengthening of the commitments of Annex I Par-
ties ... through the adoption of a protocol or another legal in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Id. 
23 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Meetings, UNFCC 
Calendar, 1997, Kyoto Climate Change Conference, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/kyoto_dec_1997/meeting/6378.php. 
24 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Kyoto 
Protocol, Art. 2, (CORRECT DATE), (available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf).  
25 Id. 
26 See UNFCCC, supra note 6. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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strument.”27 
In the United States, while the Protocol was being negoti-
ated, the 105th Congress unanimously passed Senate Resolu-
tion 98, also known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, in which the 
Senate stated that it would not ratify any treaty that had bind-
ing emission reduction targets for Annex I parties (developed 
countries) but did not have binding emission reduction targets 
for developing countries.28  China was not included as an An-
nex I party, as the UNFCCC identified it as a developing par-
ty.29  This was a critical element to China signing the Kyoto 
Protocol because, as a developing country, China did not have 
to limit or reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, as Annex I par-
ties did.  Though China is still considered a developing country, 
it has now grown to become the biggest emitter of greenhouse 
gases in the world.30 
Combined, the United States and China account for over 
40% of global GHG emissions, while the European Union as a 
whole accounts for only 13%, and the next largest single coun-
try emitting GHGs, India, accounts for only 6%.31  As such, any 
treaty or agreement that does not effectively reduce both China 
and the United States’ emissions does not regulate nearly half 
of the world’s GHG emissions and will therefore not be effective 
in tackling the climate change problem.  The principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities is at the heart of the 
United States/China gridlock, because the United States refus-
es to commit to any binding target reductions if other develop-
ing county emitters are not committed to such binding targets.  
And China, as a developing country, still faces the same barri-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Joanna Depledge, Technical Paper, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto 
Protocol: An Article-By-Article Textual History, U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (Nov. 25, 2000), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
tp/tp0200.pdf. 
28 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
29 Id. 
30Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last updated 
July 9, 2013); see also China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
NY TIMES (June 20, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/ 
worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html?_r=0. 
31 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2013). 
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ers that other developing countries face in meeting reduction 
targets such as poverty, economic inequality, out-dated tech-
nology, and under-development in the countryside.32 
IV. CHINA’S PRODUCTION AND POTENTIAL TO BECOME A WORLD 
LEADER IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
Since 1990, China's per capita energy consumption has in-
creased fivefold, while the Middle East and India saw only a 
twofold increase, and developed countries saw only moderate 
increases.33  However, despite this jump, China remains far be-
low average in energy consumption per capita, producing only 
275 kilowatt hours (kWh) per capita in 2007, compared to a 
world average of 675 kWh, and a developed country average of 
2,434 kWh per capita.34  Since 2000, China's energy consump-
tion has doubled, yet its per capita energy consumption is still 
far below average and only about one-fifth that of the U.S.35  A 
“gap remains” between China's energy savings goals, and its 
ability to meet them, indicating that, like other developing na-
tions, China requires international aid (such as from the Green 
Climate Fund36) to make meaningful reductions in its energy 
consumption.37  China is the world's largest consumer of coal, 
consuming 43% of the world total as of 2008 (almost 2.5 times 
as much as the U.S.).38  China's second largest source of energy 
after coal is oil, and China has been a net importer of oil since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Second National Communication on Climate Change of the People’s 
Republic of China, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, UNFCCC, Nov. 8, 2012 (Jan. 1, 2012), available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/library/items/3599.php?rec=j&priref=7
666#beg. 
33 ABB, supra, note 20, at 4.  
34 WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, REPORT 182 9 (Lisa Mastny ed. 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/182%20China%20Energy.pdf 
35 Id. at 8. 
36 The Green Climate Fund “contributes to the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC . . .  to promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and cli-
mate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing 
countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to 
the impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs of those develop-
ing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.” GREEN CLIMATE FUND, http://gcfund.net/home.html (last visited Jan. 
27, 2012). 
37 WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, supra note 34, at 6. 
38 Id. at 8. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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1993.39  As China’s oil reserves are insufficient to meet its en-
ergy needs, securing a reliable supply of oil, mostly from coun-
tries in the Middle East, has become increasingly important to 
China.40  
The good news is that China shows great potential for im-
provement.  As of 2012, global industry’s share of energy con-
sumption reached a world average of 40%.41  China’s industry’s 
share remains at 60% due both to outdated technology, and be-
cause a large portion of China’s economy is exporting manufac-
tured goods to developed countries.42 Because China and other 
developing countries export much of their manufactured goods, 
reducing their industries’ shares of energy consumption would 
have a positive impact worldwide.  
V. NEGOTIATIONS IN DOHA 
During November 26 through December 8, 2012, world 
leaders met in Doha, Qatar for the latest rounds of climate 
change negotiations known as Conference of the Parties 18 
(“COP 18”).  The negotiations in Doha stemmed from many 
Conferences of the Parties before it.  The last two, COP 16 and 
17 stand out as particularly significant to the conference in 
Doha. COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico set a target to keep global 
temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels by year 2100.43  COP 17, in Durban, South Africa result-
ed in the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which set the 
goal for a new treaty to be negotiated by 2015 to enter into ef-
fect by 2020.44  COP 17 also agreed to a second commitment pe-
riod (“CP2”) for the Kyoto Protocol.   
In Doha, Qatar, the parties agreed on the second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol rules and officially shut down 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. 
40 Id. Also note that between 2004 and 2008, a surge in world oil prices 
caused a decrease in energy intensity in all nations except China. ABB, supra 
note 20, at 2. 
41 ABB, supra note 20, at 4. 
42 Id.  
43 Cancun Climate Change Conference, UNFCCC (2010), http://unfccc.int/ 
meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php. 
44 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 
UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
9
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the two previous tracks for negotiations45 under the COP leav-
ing only the Durban Platform.  One of the most important out-
comes of the Doha Conference (“COP 18”) is Annex I parties’ 
commitment to emission reduction targets under the second 
commitment period.46  Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(“AWG-LCA”) was tasked with negotiating the terms of the se-
cond commitment period before it officially stopped operating 
at the end of the conference.47  Leading into COP 18, the second 
commitment period was already plagued with uncertainty and 
hotly contested issues.48  For starters, at the end of the Durban 
Conference (“COP 17”), Canada officially left the Kyoto Proto-
col. Leading up to COP 18, Japan and Russia both firmly stat-
ed that they would not commit to a second commitment period, 
and Australia and New Zealand were both “wavering.”49  Also 
at issue for the second commitment period was whether the 
commitment period would last a total of five or eight years and 
the “ambition level” of the emission reduction targets.50  The 
European Union was largely supportive of an eight-year com-
mitment period, while many developing countries supported a 
five-year commitment period in order to reevaluate the ambi-
tion level following the publication of the new Intergovernmen-
tal Panel of Climate Change (“IPCC”) report due in 2014.51  As 
far as ambition levels are concerned, most developing countries 
called for reductions somewhere between forty and fifty percent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 These two tracks for negotiations were called the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (“AWG-LCA”) 
and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (“AWG-KP”). See United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, UNFCCC.INT, http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/ 
6431.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
46 Meena Raman & Asad Rehman, Doha: The Moment of Truth, AL 
JAZEERA MAGAZINE, Nov. 2012, at 4. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 5. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Jessica Boyle, A Mirage in the Deserts of Doha? Assessing the outcomes 
of COP 18, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 
2012, at 3, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/com_mirage_desert_ 
doha_cop18.pdf. 
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below 1990 levels by 2020.52  The alliance of small island states 
pressed for emission reductions of at least thirty-three percent, 
while the European Union set its own reduction target at twen-
ty-percent.53 
 The countries that have signed on to the second commit-
ment only account for 15% of global carbon emissions.54  Cana-
da, Russia, Japan, and New Zealand all will not be taking part 
in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.55  
AWG-KP eventually agreed to an eight-year commitment peri-
od with a “compromised review function” so that CP 2 parties 
can reevaluate their ambition levels after the 2014 IPCC re-
port.56  In addition, as far as ambition levels are concerned, 
emission reduction targets for CP 2 are rather consistent with 
voluntary targets agreed to under the Copenhagen Accord.57 
Countries that did not commit to targets under CP 2, in 
the end were not granted access to “Flexibility Mechanisms” 
such as the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM” and Joint 
Implementation.58  According to the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, “this decision will be a considerable 
disappointment to regional trading schemes in New Zealand 
and Japan (and potentially others) that currently have access 
to CDM markets but will not under CP 2.”59  Furthermore, de-
veloping countries were granted an increase in the “share of 
proceeds” from carbon market mechanisms.60  When analyzed 
under a viewpoint of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties, this is an acknowledgement that developing countries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Rahman, supra note 45, at 4.  
53 Id. 
54 Jennifer Morgan, Reflections on Cop 18 in Doha: Negotiators Made On-
ly Incremental Progress, INSIGHTS.WRI.ORG at ¶ 2 (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/12/reflections-cop-18-doha-negotiators-
made-only-incremental-progress. 
55 Boyle, supra note 50, at 2-3) (Australia, Belarus, Croatia, Iceland, Ka-
zakhstan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine will all 
be following the EU in continuing mitigation commitments under CP2.).  
56 Id. at 3. 
57 Id. (It is also important to note that many of the countries including 
New Zealand who did not commit to binding reduction targets under CP 2 are 
still committed to their Copenhagen targets, which are not legally binding.). 
58 Id.   
 
59 Id.   
60 Id.  
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need aid from developed countries to meet their reduction goals 
and develop in a sustainable manner. 
Doha marked another development in the area of climate 
finance because the “fast-start finance” period ended in 2012.61  
Fast Start Finance was a program to aid developing countries 
in mitigation, adaptation, and technology development and 
transfer, which were supposed to total approximately $30 bil-
lion from 2010 to 2012.62  In Copenhagen, countries committed 
to contributing $100 billion to the Green Climate Fund begin-
ning in 2020.  Some parties were hopeful that COP 18 would 
provide financial assistance by filling in the finance gap be-
tween the end of Fast Start Finance and the beginning of the 
finance period agreed to in Copenhagen, but COP 18 failed to 
produce such an agreement.  The Vice Chairman of China's 
National Development and Reform Commission, Xie Zhenhua, 
who heads the Chinese delegation at climate change negotia-
tions, stated that "[o]ne major concern is that there must be a 
solution for financing.  There is long term financing of $100 bil-
lion, which is being talked about, but the focus must be on the 
medium term, that is 2013-20.  There has to be a clear decision 
on injection of capital from next year to 2020."63  This reiterates 
China’s position as a developing nation in dire need of financial 
and technological assistance in meeting GHG reduction goals.  
Furthermore, the International Institute for Sustainable De-
velopment noted that: 
[i]nsofar as the process did achieve the key procedural goals of 
securing a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, see-
ing the AWG-LCA track draw to a close, and continuing to shape 
discussions under the Durban Platform, Doha can be measured a 
“success.” But insofar as concrete or substantial progress was 
made on key issues including the architecture of a post-2020 
agreement, mitigation and financing commitments, the outcomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Morgan, supra note 53, ¶ 3.  
62 Fast-start Finance, UNFCCC.INT, 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/ 
financial_mechanism/fast_start_finance/items/5646.php (last updated 
June 3, 2013).  
63 Urmi A Goswami, United Nations Climate Change Negotiations 2012: 
The BASIC Countries Demand More Fund to Tackle Climate Change, THE 
ECONOMIC TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://articles.economictimes. 
indiatimes.com/2012-12-05/news/35620325_1_bali-road-map-green-
climate-fund-durban-countries.  
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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were woefully inadequate.64  
A major development in granting climate related aid to de-
veloping countries that emerged during COP 18 is when the 
“Parties agreed to establish by COP 19 ‘institutional arrange-
ments, such as an international mechanism’ that would help 
vulnerable, developing countries deal with the irrecoverable 
losses and damages from climate change.”65   
Furthermore, this decision:  
Invites all Parties, taking into account common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and specific national 
and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstanc-
es, to enhance action on addressing loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change, taking into account 
national development processes …66  
Such actions would include the assessment of “the risks of 
loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate 
change,”67 designing country-specific risk management strate-
gies,68 and “involving vulnerable communities and populations 
and civil society, the private sector and other relevant stake-
holders, in the assessment of and response to loss and dam-
age.”69   In line with the earlier mention of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities, this decision also requests, “developed 
country Parties […] provide developing country Parties with fi-
nance, technology and capacity-building.”70 
This reiterates the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in responding to the adverse impacts on climate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Boyle, supra note 50, at 1. 
65 Supra note 30 ¶ 4; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, 
FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/REV.1 ¶ 9 (Dec. 8, 2012), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
2012/cop18/eng/l04r01.pdf. 
66 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ap-
proaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts 
in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/REV.1 ¶ 6 
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/l04r01.pdf. 
67 Id. ¶ 6(a). 
68 Id. ¶ 6(b). 
69 Id. ¶ 6(f). 
70 Id. ¶ 8. 
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change in developing countries.  Climate change has already 
had an impact on China’s agriculture,71 distribution of water 
resources,72 forest eco-systems,73 sea levels, and human 
health.74  As Su Wei, a member of the China’s delegation at the 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali comment-
ed: “China is in the process of industrialization and there is a 
need for economic growth to meet the basic needs of the people 
and fight against poverty.”75  Furthermore, Wei added “I just 
wonder whether it's fair to ask developing countries like China 
to take on binding targets or mandatory targets . . . I think 
there is much room for the United States to think whether it's 
possible to change (its) lifestyle and consumption patterns in 
order to contribute to the protection of the global climate.”76  
Although these comments were made regarding the Bali Cli-
mate Change Conference in 2007 (“COP 13”), it is important to 
note the slow movement of progress. 
It is obvious from the slow movement of progress in the 
last few Conferences of the Parties that if China wants to re-
duce the negative impact of climate change on its people’s 
health and agriculture, that another approach has to be taken 
in these negotiations by major developing country emitters.  As 
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked, “More needs 
to be done.”77  Furthermore, while Xie Zhenhua acknowledged 
that: “The Doha conference has met Chinese delegate's expec-
tations, and we are satisfied with the outcome,” he continued to 
say that “China will follow a low-carbon path and contribute to 
fighting climate change on the basis of equal and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities while pursuing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Second Nat’l Commc’n  on Climate Change of the People’s Republic of 
China, 12 (2012), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/chnnc2e.pdf. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 13. 
74 Id.  
75 China, U.S. Face Off on Climate Policies: Differences over who should 
cut carbon emissions and how, NBC NEWS, Dec. 7, 2007, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22148697/ns/us_news-environment/t/china-us-
face-climate-policies/#.UUZcK6W5g5g. 
76 Id.  
77 Doha Talks End with Slight Progress, CHINA.ORG.CN (Dec. 10, 
2012), http://www.china.org.cn/environment/doha_climate_talks/ 
2012-12/10/content_27363169.htm. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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sustainable development.”78  During negotiations, Zhenhua 
presented China’s first climate documentary called “Warm and 
Cold, We Share Together.”  The documentary, in which hun-
dreds of scientists, experts, and officials took part, described 
the “relationship between the change of ecological environment 
and human civilization from both historical and realistic per-
spectives . . . [while also] . . . call[ing] on the mankind to take 
the responsibility to deal with the consequences of environment 
degradation and adopt a path of sustainable development.”79 
Zhenhua also “called on developed economies to be more ambi-
tious in cutting greenhouse gas emissions and raise the money 
needed to help developing economies address climate change.”80  
Thus, the International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment (“IISD”) noted that “China has been particularly vocal in 
the ADP81 track, reinforcing beliefs that any future mitigation 
agreement must be firmly rooted in the principle of CBDR and 
reflect developed countries’ disproportionate historical respon-
sibility for emissions.”82 Furthermore, the IISD acknowledged 
that: 
All parties agree that there will be differentiation in action under 
a future agreement, particularly with respect to least developed 
countries and small island states.  The key question remains how 
to design a regime that brings the major emitters from both the 
developed and developing worlds together under the same rules-
based system.  It is this discussion that will be important to 
watch as the ADP takes shape, particularly as balances of power 
shift.  By 2025, the combined GDP of China and India is set to be 
bigger than that of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada put together.83 
China’s role in negotiations were significant because it is a 
major emitter, a rapidly growing GDP, and it hangs onto the 
principal of CBDR so tightly that its blocking progress in nego-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Id. 
79 China Presents Climate Documentary to UN Official, CHINA.ORG.CN 
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.china.org.cn/environment/doha_climate_talks/ 
2012-12/09/content_27359415.htm.  
80 Doha Talks End with Slight Progress, supra note 76.  
81 ADP stands for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action. See Boyle, supra note 50, at 1. 
82 Boyle, supra note 50, at 9. 
83 Id. 
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tiations that need to be made in order to significantly reduce 
global GHG emissions.  Some of the policies and actions that 
China has undertaken in response to climate change adapta-
tion include enhancing infrastructures in coastal zones, estab-
lishing direct online reporting systems for infectious disease 
outbreaks and public health emergencies, and enhancing scien-
tific research on climate change.84   
In order for China to implement these crucial actions and 
policies, they need to have the available funds and technologies 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation.85  Thus, “the de-
veloped countries should fulfill their commitments by providing 
funds, technologies and supports in capacity building to the de-
veloping countries, which is the fundamental assurance for the 
developing countries to effectively address climate change.”86  
Despite the progress it has made in mitigation and adaptation, 
China still has a dire need for aid in capacity building if it 
wants to reduce global climate impact in a meaningful manner. 
VII. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATIONS  
“The threat from climate change is serious, it is urgent, 
and it is growing.  Our generation’s response to this challenge 
will be judged by history, for if we fail to meet it—boldly, swift-
ly, and together—we risk consigning future generations to an 
irreversible catastrophe,” President Barack Obama said at the 
United Nations Summit on Climate Change on September 22, 
2009.87   
In the past few years, the United States has been actively 
interested in the issue of climate change through domestic poli-
cy actions.  One such action was the passage of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which allocated over $90 bil-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Second 
National Communication on Climate Change of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na, supra note 70, at 14.  
85 Id. at 22. 
86 Id.  
87 Fifth Nat’l Commc’n of the U.S. Under the U.N. Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, U.S. Climate Action Rep., 1 (2010), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa_nc5.pdf.  
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/9
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lion for investments in clean energy and green jobs.88  In 2009, 
President Obama issued an Executive Order “requiring federal 
agencies to set and meet strict GHG reduction targets by 
2020.”89  In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) set GHG “emissions thresholds” to limit the emissions 
of the nation’s largest emitters including power plants, refiner-
ies, and cement production facilities, facilities covered under 
the Clean Air Act.90  There has also been a push “. . . for more 
aggressive efficiency standards for common household appli-
ances.”91  Additionally, in 2009, the United States began the 
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Pro-
gram, which is “ . . . the first-ever joint fuel economy and car-
bon dioxide tailpipe emission standards for cars and light-duty 
trucks began.”92  Thus, “throughout the United States, Ameri-
cans are taking action to address the grave challenge of climate 
change, and to promote a sustainable and prosperous clean en-
ergy future.  These efforts are occurring at all levels of govern-
ment, in the private sector, and through the everyday decisions 
of individual citizens.”93 
Despite United States Special Envoy Todd Stern’s asser-
tion at the Doha Conference that the United States is on track 
to meet its voluntary 16.3% cut in emissions by 2020,94 other 
reports by the Energy Information Administration and White 
House Council for Environmental Equality indicate that the 
United States will only meet between a 9% and 10% reduction 
from 2005 levels.95  These less optimistic projections are in 
spite of the EPA’s latest decision to regulate emissions from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Id. at 1- 2. 
89 Id. at 3.  
90 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Regulatory  
Initiatives,http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-
initiatives.html (last visited at Mar. 17, 2013). 
91 U.S. Climate Action Report, supra note 86, at 3. 
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. at 1-2. 
94 Suzanne Goldenberg, US Envoy’s Cutting Remark on CO2 Emissions 
Fails to Add Up, The Guardian (Dec. 6, 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/  
environment/2012/dec/06/us-envoy-emission-cut-doha-climate. 
95 Id.; see also Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman, US Status on Climate 
Change Mitigation, Discussion Paper (Resources For the Future., D.C.), October 
2012, at 15available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-48.pdf.  
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new motor vehicles and coal fired plants.96 
Stern stated in a speech at Dartmouth College this past 
summer that: 
Climate change negotiations are very difficult…because climate 
change is not just an environmental issue – it implicates virtual-
ly every aspect of national economies, including industry, energy, 
transportation, agriculture and forests. So limits on emissions 
make countries nervous about economic growth and develop-
ment.”97 
Stern went on to say that negotiations are complicated by 
the fact that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change includes over 190 countries that have estab-
lished various alliances with each other with differing objec-
tives, viewpoints, and intersecting priorities and agendas.98  
Furthermore, “north-south resentments continue to rile the de-
bate” and “negotiations are governed by a consensus rule of 
procedure, which, in effect, enables any small handful of de-
termined countries to block progress.”99   
Stern went on to criticize what he called a “dubious foun-
dation” of past Conference of the Parties meetings, specifically 
in Copenhagen: the principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities.100  He continued to claim that: 
The prevailing paradigm of climate negotiations was still that a 
firewall existed between developed and developing countries as 
they were defined in the 1992 Framework Convention, with all 
specific obligations to cut emissions assigned to developed coun-
tries. This paradigm is embodied in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol . . . 
The U.S. never thought that paradigm was legitimate. In 2009 
[Copenhagen] we saw it as an unworkable basis for moving for-
ward.101 
While Stern acknowledged China’s “economic success” and 
determination in being a world leader in renewable energies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See generally Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
97 Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change, Remarks at Dartmouth 
College, (Aug, 12, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/ 
2012/196004.htm. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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he also acknowledged the scientific fact that developing coun-
tries currently account for approximately 55% of global emis-
sions from fossil fuels, a figure that may rise to 65% by 2030.102  
Under the current regime of the Kyoto Protocol, which treats 
all developing countries equally, leaving such a large percent-
age of global emissions unaccounted for and unrestricted does 
create undeniable problematic effects.  In addition, such a re-
gime will most likely make meeting the goal of keeping the 
global average temperature below a rise of 2-degrees Celsius by 
year 2100 target unattainable. 
Furthermore, Stern suggests that a global climate change 
treaty should account for all major emitters, both developed 
and developing, equaling approximately 80% of global emis-
sions and “build out from there.”103  He also reiterated the ma-
jor political obstacle for the United States, the Byrd-Hagel Res-
olution, emphasizing that: 
Securing Senate support for climate agreements is difficult under 
any circumstances, but unless all major countries are seen as 
committing to real action, it will be hopeless. Of course, the ac-
tions of different countries need not be the same – addressing 
climate change is not a one-size fits all proposition – but they 
need to be seen as fair.104 
Stern emphasizes that reduction targets should be volun-
tary based on a country’s own capabilities, because an agree-
ment that tries to force a country to accept the terms of a treaty 
that are unfavorable to the country’s interests, will most likely 
not be successful.105  These voluntary commitments would then 
be legally binding at either the national or international lev-
el.106  Stern admits that these goals may not be stringent 
enough to meet the 2-degree goal, but such a treaty would be 
less likely to result in the “deadlock” that we see now.107  The 
United States is calling for a treaty that will be “applicable to 
all” but also takes into account each country’s “circumstances, 
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capabilities, and responsibilities.”108   
It can be inferred from Stern’s speech that binding reduc-
tion targets for developed countries, but not developing coun-
tries, provide a huge hindrance to climate change negotiations 
in general, and most currently impacted the climate change 
negotiations in Doha.  More importantly, requiring that only 
developed country parties reduce their GHG emissions under-
mines the ultimate objective of the Convention stated in Article 
2, which is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with climate system.”109 
A treaty more in line with Stern’s suggestions, while not 
guaranteeing that the 2-degree target is met, may be more ef-
fective overall in reducing GHG emissions.  It may also encour-
age developed country Parties to agree to reduction limits and 
may also in turn encourage developed country Parties to partic-
ipate in climate finance programs such as the Green Climate 
Fund.110  It seems likely that if the participation of developing 
countries was contingent on receiving international aid or 
funding, then developed countries might feel incentive to re-
duce binding targets.   
VIII. AFTER DOHA 
After Doha, Ban Ki-moon stressed that: “[a] global climate 
change agreement would give us the engine we need to advance 
us decisively on this path.”111  In addition, Ki-moon remarked: 
“I welcome President Obama’s new resolve to address climate 
change and give it high political priority.”112  Furthermore, 
when addressing the current obstacles, Ki-moon says he is 
“reaching out to government and business leaders to mobilize 
the capital and the political will for a global, legally binding 
climate change agreement by 2015. World leaders have pledged 
to reach an agreement, and we must hold them to that prom-	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ise.”113 
In addition, the ADP met twice since Doha to discuss fu-
ture plans for the 19th Session of the Conference of the Parties, 
which took place on November 11 to November 22, 2013 in 
Warsaw, Poland.114  The ADP agreed that they needed at least 
one additional session in 2014, and requested that the incom-
ing co-chairs of the ADP propose a “balanced focused, and more 
formal mode of work” for Warsaw.115 
In November 2014, the White House issued a joint an-
nouncement from the United States and China, which ad-
dressed the post 2020 actions  “to transition to low-carbon 
economies, [to be] mindful of the global temperature goal of 2-
degrees Celsius.”116 
The announcement specifically focused on the future of 
“reaching an ambitious 2015 agreement that reflects the prin-
ciple of common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities, in light of different national circumstances.”117  
This seems to be a positive step for both countries as it stresses 
“the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation on cli-
mate change.”118  
Finally, President Obama and President Xi have high 
hopes for the 2015 UNCC which will take place in Paris as they 
discuss their goals of “adopt[ing] a protocol, another legal in-
strument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Con-
vention applicable to all Parties at the United Nations Climate 
Conference in Paris in 2015.”119  While there is still much work 
to be done for the United States to meet the continued goal of 
reducing emissions by 28% in 2025, the announcement does 	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point to many efforts taken by both countries utilizing re-
sources such as the United States-China Climate Change 
Working Group, the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center 
and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.120  Ulti-
mately, the countries “hope that by announcing these targets 
now, they can inject momentum into the global climate negotia-
tions and inspire other countries to join in coming forward with 
ambitious actions as soon as possible.”121 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Common but differentiated responsibilities is an important and 
foundational principle in climate change treaties, but may not 
need to be adhered to so strictly.  This principle is essential to 
ensuring that those with the political, social, and economic 
ability to confront the problem of climate change do so.  How-
ever, it should not be adhered to so strictly that it deadlocks 
negotiations between developed and developing countries and 
hinders progress in actually solving the problem.  The principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities is an important 
element in the area of climate finance, technology transfer, and 
capacity building.  If this principle was entirely absent from 
the area of climate finance, then developing countries and 
those vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change 
would be unfairly left to fix a problem that they had in some 
cases very little part of creating.  And just as importantly, de-
veloping countries with large amounts of GHGs, while contrib-
uting to the climate change problem, without help from the de-
veloped world will not be able to reduce their emissions 
substantially without significant damage to their own econo-	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mies and the social and political issues that arise from such 
damage.  
China is a country that currently contributes greatly to 
global climate change, but unfortunately cannot be expected to 
reduce its GHG emissions significantly on its own. On the other 
hand the United States cannot be expected to agree to interna-
tional binding targets if other major emitters are also not ex-
pected to do so.  
 Although progress has been made by both countries to re-
duce emissions, negotiations need to go in the direction which 
Stern suggested in which all major emitters are committed to 
binding reduction targets whether voluntary or imposed by an 
international body.  Logistically this requires more contribu-
tions from developed countries to finance climate programs 
such as the Green Climate Fund.  It is possible to have legally 
binding voluntary reduction targets for all major emitters, both 
developed and developing, while still adhering to the principles 
of the convention, which state that: “the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effects thereof.”122 
The United States’ view is not inconsistent with its ratifi-
cation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change.  The United States can and should be a leader in 
future climate change negotiations by advocating for a more 
equal and effective climate change treaty in 2015.  
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